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CIVIL LAW-SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-PARENT AND
CHILD LIABILITY: Is A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT VIOLATED? -Spence

v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
1.

INTRODUCTION

One of the cornerstones of American law is that an individual
should not be legally burdened for the wrongs of another on the
mere basis of one's relationship or association with the person who
committed a wrong. l This concept of individual liability has mani
fested itself in both civil and criminal law, with the latter giving rise
to the notion that one is innocent until proven guilty.2
The civil and criminal arenas have dealt with this theory of in
dividualliability in a range of cases. It has been held, for example,
that there is a fundamental right to freedom of association with sub
versive political groups;3 that one cannot be held liable for having a
certain status, such as being a drug addict;4 and that legal burdens
cannot be imposed on family members for the acts or status of an
other family member, such as illegitimacy5 or a mother's violent acts
against a third person. 6
The broad proposition that individuals have a substantive due
process right not to be civilly punished for the acts of another has
rarely been narrowed by courts, and courts have narrowed this prop
osition only when public policy has strongly necessitated such ac
tion. 7 One area in which public policy considerations have come
I. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). ("Freedom from punishment in
the absence of personal guilt is a fundamental concept in the American scheme of jus
tice." Id at 425 (emphasis in original).
2. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 8 at 53 (1972). See
also MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 342 at 805 (E. Cleary ed.
1972).
3. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
4. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). (Court invalidated
a Louisiana statute which granted workmen's compensation benefits to legitimate chil
dren for the death of a parent but deprived benefits to illegitimate children.
6. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974). (Children cannot be expelled
from school for their mother's act of hitting the school's vice-principal).
7. Id at 425-26.
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment
on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship
of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity. . . ,that re1a
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into play is with parent and child liability. Early tort law declared
that parents were not liable for the torts of their children merely be
cause of their parenthood and were liable only if they ratified or
consented to the child's act or if the act fell under a traditional tort
liability category.8 Many states found this system unworkable how
ever, since the financial situation of many minors often left plaintiffs
uncompensated. 9 Thus states have enacted statutes holding parents
financially liable for certain types of property or physical injury.lO
The question is whether strong public policy considerations
were present in Spence v. Gormley, II wherein two women were le
gally burdened, in the form of evictions, due to their maternal rela
tionship with the young men who were accused of firebombing their
neighbor's apartments. 12
This note will establish that there is a substantive due process
right not to be legally burdened for a wrong unless one is responsible
for committing that wrong. It shall also be demonstrated that this
right not to be burdened is a fundamental right. 13 The relationship
between parental liability for the acts of their children and the right
not to be burdened for the wrongs of another will be explored within
the context of the facts presented in Spence v. Gormley. 14
Specifically, this note will examine how the traditional law of
torts, which generally holds parents blameless for their children's
wrongs, has been statutorily narrowed in order to effectuate the goal
that victims be adequately compensated. It will then be shown that
the solution to protecting this fundamental right is to increase the
burden of proof beyond a mere "preponderance of the evidence" to
a standard of "clear and convincing evidence." Furthermore, this
note contends that when a court is presented with the issue of the
right not to be burdened, it ought to contemplate less restrictive al
ternatives before imposing a harsh judicial remedy.
Throughout, the note will indicate how an entirely different re
sult might have emerged (1) had the supreme judicial court not as
sumed facts that the trial court did not find; (2) had the cases not
tionship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt
Id (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961».
8. 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
9. Id at 259-60, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
10. 67A C.l.S. Parent and Child § 123 (1978).
II. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 871 (4th ed. 1971).
12. See infra note 87.
13. See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
14. 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
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been consolidated;IS and (3) had the court properly categorized the
right to freedom from liability without individual guilt as a funda
mental or important right. This heightened status may only be in
fringed upon after strict or intermediate scrutiny rather than a
rational basis standard. 16
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April, 1981 and May, 1981, the Boston Housing Authority
(BHA) started summary process eviction proceedings against two
families, the Gormleys and the Buntings, for alleged violent acts to
BHA property and/or BHA employees by the two families' sons. 17
. The Boston Housing Court, as trier of fact, allowed the eviction of
each of the families. IS The Housing Court based its decisions on
findings that on May 11, 1980, Mark McDonough, son of Mrs.
Gormley, firebombed the BHA-owned apartment of a black family,
and that on July 17, 1980, he assaulted a black BHA employee. 19
The court similarly found that William Bunting participated in a ra
cially motivated firebombing of a BHA apartment on November 7,
1980.20
The supreme judicial court granted a request for direct appel
late review, and in so doing, consolidated the previously separate
cases of the Gormleys and Buntings into one action. 21 Mrs. Gor
mley's son Mark was sixteen at the time of the alleged incident and
living at home. 22 When the supreme judicial court heard the case,
Mark was serving the second year of a six-to-ten year sentence for
crimes unrelated to the firebombings. 23 While Mrs. Gormley stated
that she did not intend to let her son Mark return home after his
release from prison, Mark stated that he did intend to return home. 24
William Bunting, Mrs. Bunting's son, was eighteen when the
15. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
16. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 274, 439 N.E.2d at 751. See also St. Ann, 495 F.2d at
427: "Having established a significant encroachment upon a basic element of due pro
cess, the state, in order to justify this encroachment, must satisfy a substantial burden
. . . . One must analyze the compelling reason . . . ." (emphasis in original).
17. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
18. Id. at 259, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
21. Id. at 258, 439 N.E.2d at 742.
22. Id. at 259-60, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
23. Id. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
24. Id.
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firebombing occurred,25 and was thus an adult. William had been in
the custody of the Division of Youth Services (DYS) from the ages
of eleven to eighteen, at which time he could only visit home once a
month. 26 At the time of the incident, however, William was no
longer under the DYS program and visited home sporadically.27
The fact that William no longer lived at home also distinguished him
from Mark McDonough.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS BY THE COURT

Lease Provisions

The supreme judicial court began its review of whether Mrs.
Gormley and Mrs. Bunting could be evicted for the alleged acts of
their sons by carefully examining the leases signed by the tenants. 28
Out of the ten permissible grounds for termination of tenancy
by the BRA, there were three which the court found applicable to
the present case. 29 While the firebombings of BRA property and as
sault of a BRA employee would have been sufficient reason to evict
a tenant according to the lease provisions, the issue was whether the
provisions for termination applied to household members who had
not signed the lease and were not named as tenants.
The court found that the provisions did apply to household
members under the premise that the acts committed constituted a
threat to "health and safety or a likelihood of interference with
rights."30 The court believed that the wording of the lease suggested
support for the eviction if the problem came from within the house
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 261-63, 439 N.E.2d at 744-45. Mrs. Gormley and Mrs. Bunting had
signed identical lease forms and were the sole persons signed as "tenant" on their respec
tive leases. The lease form itself was a result of collective bargaining between the Boston
Public Housing Tenants' Policy Council, Inc. and the BHA. Id at 261, 439 N.E.2d at
744.
29. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 261-62, 439 N.E.2d at 744. The court found the perti
nent provisions to be:
This lease may be terminated by the [BHA) . . . for no reason other than
. . . 2. Reasonable likelihood of serious repeated interference with the rights of
other tenants . . . 5. Creation or maintenance of a serious threat to the health or
safety of other tenants . . . 10. 'In the event of a violation by the Tenant of any
of the terms, conditions or covenants of this lease. In addition, . . . [the tenant
agrees to) [l)ive in a peaceful way, respecting the rights of his neighbors to pri
vacy and quiet.
Id
30. Id at 262, 439 N.E.2d at 744.
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hold, regardless of whether the source of the problem was the actual
tenant or merely a family member. 3l The court also found such a
result to be harmonious with the primary purpose of the termination
provisions that existed to promote safety and order within BHA
housing. 32

B. Statutory Requirement of Cause
The court then considered the tenants' argument that in order
for the BHA to terminate a lease in these factual situations, it must
be shown that the mothers were personally responsible for their sons'
conduct. 33 In rejecting this argument, the court referred to the statu
tory requirement of Massachusetts General Laws c. 121B § 32 which
stipulates that a housing authority, such as the BHA, cannot "termi
nate a tenancy without 'cause.' "34 The court concluded that, in ac
cordance with the statutory provisions, "violent acts by household
members can constitute 'cause' to terminate a tenancy."35 The court
further stated that an amendment to § 32, added after these cases
arose, which specifically included members of the tenant's household
in considering causes for eviction, lent support for the proposition
that the legislature approved of the inclusion of household mem
bers.36 Prior to the amendment, the court found sufficient cause to
terminate absent the tenant's ability to show that they could not fore
see or prevent the violence. 37
The two exceptions to the cause requirement, which allow ter
mination only when there is a connection between the tenant and the
conduct underlying the discontinuance of the" tenancy, are as follows:
I) when the circumstances indicate that the consequences of the evic
tion will be severe; and 2) when there are "unsettled constitutional
questions."38
C.

Constitutional Claims

The unsettled constitutional questions exception led the court
into a discussion of the tenants' constitutional claim, which is the
focus of this article. Simply stated, the tenants' argued that there is a
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 263, 439 N.E.2d at 745.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1218, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84).
Gormley, 387 Mass. at 263-64, 439 N.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 264 n.6, 439 N.E.2d at 745 n.6. For a counter argument see infra note 91.
Id. at 265, 439 N.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 264, 439 N.E.2d at 745.
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due process right, beyond the reach ofMGL c.121B § 32, which re
quires that a tenancy not be terminated without proof that the
mothers were responsible for their sons' acts.39 The supreme judicial
court found that this due process right was not applicable when the
public health, safety or welfare was concemed. 40 The court added
that no higher standard of proof was necessary beyond the 'prepon
derance of evidence' standard used41 for this lesser status right.
IV.

ESTABLISHING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE BURDENED
ONLY UPON PERSONAL LIABILITY

A.

lJue Process Goes Beyond the Bill of Rights

It was established in St. Ann. v. Palisi 42 that "substantive due
process rights are not limited to those liberties specifically enumer
ated in the Bill of Rights."43 One of those rights not mentioned in the
Constitution, but that nevertheless exists, is the right of an individual
not to be legally burdened unless the individual is personally
responsible.
Since this right is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of
Rights, it is necessary to find substantiation of the existence of the
right from other sources. St. Ann unequivocally established the
weight, or importance, of this right when the court declared that
"[f]reedom from punishment in the absence of personal guilt is a
fundamental concept in the American scheme. In order to intrude
upon this fundamental liberty governments must satisfy a substantial
burden of justification."44 The court in Tyson v. New York City
Housing Authority4s proclaimed the weight of this right by stating
that "the concepts of personal guilt and individual responsibility
... are touchstones of the Anglo-American system of law . . . im
plicit within the concept of due process is that liability may be im
posed on an individual only as a result of that person's own acts or
omissions."46
39. Id at 270,439 N.E.2d at 748.
40. Id at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 750.
41. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. Id at 425.
43. Id (citing Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the court
held that wearing long hair in a public school is not subject to constitutional protection,
and thus any such regulation need only meet minimum rationality tests).
44. 369 F: Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
45. Id at 518.
46. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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B. The Perimeters of the Right
In Scales v. United States ,47 the Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of whether or not a person could be held liable for merely asso
ciating with a criminal organization.48 The Court held that "[i]n our
jurisprudence guilt is personal," implying that association, without
more, is not a criminal wrong. 49
Freedom of association is not the only area afforded protection.
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court struck down a statute
which made it a crime to be a drug addict, reasoning that the status
of a person does not involve criminal activity. so The Court found the
California statute offensive in that it allowed a conviction simply
based upon Robinson's" 'status' or 'chronic condition' ... [of] be
ing 'addicted to the use of narcotics.' "S 1
The substantive right of liability for individual guilt is not lim
ited to the criminal arena. Oliver Wendell Holmes established this
point succinctly when he said, "criminal liability, as well as civil, is
founded on blameworthiness . . . . [A] law which punished conduct
which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the com
munity would be too severe for that community to bear."s2
This substantive right surfaced again when the Supreme Court
expressed its distaste for differentiating between legitimate and ille
gitimate children. S3 The Court stated: "[I]mposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concepts of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsi
bility or wrongdoing."s4
47. Id
48. Id at 224. The Court established that "[m)embership, without more, in an
organization [said to be) engaged in illegal advocacy," was not criminal. Id at 225. The
Court then stated that not all associational relationships were beyond liability. Conspir
acy and complicity, the Court noted, were punishable offenses even without "the com
mission of specific acts of criminality." Id
49. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
50. Id The Court noted that the California statute, under which Robinson was
arrested, did not require proof that narcotics were actually used in the jurisdiction, and
that the jury had been instructed that they could convict Robinson even if they did not
believe the evidence of his use of narcotics. Id at 665.
51. Id
52. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). This idea was repeated by the
court in Tyson, which stated: ''This notion of personal guilt is not limited to criminal
actions." Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority, 369 F. Supp. 513,519 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
53. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See supra
note 5.
54. Id
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The right to associate with criminals was upheld in the civil case
of Sawyer v. Sandstrom,55 which disallowed a loitering ordinance
since it "punishe[d] an individual not for his own criminal acts, but
rather for his act of being in a public place and associating with indi
viduals whom he knows to be engaged in criminal activity, ie., drug
use or possession."56 The Sawyer court further stated that it was in
full agreement with the Supreme Court that "punishment must be
predicated only upon personal guilt."57
Lastly, this fundamental right appeared in a civil case, factually
similar to Gormley.58 In Tyson v. New York City Housing Author
ity,59 the court held it to be violative of the fourteenth amendment to
evict tenants from their public housing for the criminal acts commit
ted by their family members who were not living at home at the
time. 60 The court found the link of parental blameworthiness too
weak: "There must be some causal nexus between the imposition of
the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own conduct. Defendants
rely simply on the existence of the parent-child relationship."61
In St. Ann v. Palisi,62 the connection between the weight and
importance of the substantive due process right and the burden that
the state must bear was made explicit by the court:
[T]he children do not complain that they were denied the constitu
tional right to an education, but that they were punished without
being personally guilty. Thus a cardinal notion of liberty is in
volved and substantive due process is applicable.
Having established a significant encroachment upon a basic
element of due process, the state, in order to justify this encroach
ment, must satisfy a substantial burden. 63
55. 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. fd. at 316. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), in which Justice
Murphy stated that "[t]he deportation statute completely ignores the traditional Ameri
can doctrine requiring personal guilt rather than guilt by association or imputation
before a penalty or punishment is inflicted." fd. at 163 (Murphy, J., concurring).
57. Sawyer, 615 F.2d at 316.
58. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
59. 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
60. fd. at 521.
61. fd. at 519. This case was brought as a class action but not allowed to continue
as such. The plaintiffs in Tyson had been declared undesirable tenants and faced evic
tion because of the conduct of their adult children. fd.
62. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. fd. at 426-27 (emphasis in original). See infra notes 141-46 and accompany
ing text for further discussion regarding substantial burden of proof.
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C. Distinguishing and Extending the Fundamental Right Cases

While Scales v. United States 64 reinforces the doctrine of per
sonal guilt and its importance in determining liability, Scales may be
distinguished from Gormley in two respects. First, Scales was a
criminal case, which distinguishes it from Gormley in that there is
concern regarding the severity of the offender's punishment. The
loss of liberty in a criminal case is often more severe than a civil
remedy, thus the standard of proof is higher in a criminal case. 65
Secondly Scales involved a pure freedom of association issue. While
freedom to associate with a political or religious group and personal
guilt for liability are two of the principle foundations underlying our
system of jurisprudence, they are not identical. The two doctrines
are entwined, however, in that one is allowed the freedom to associ
ate with illegal groups because one cannot be burdened without per
sonal guilt. 66
It is not clear, though, that the freedom to associate is protected
on a personal level. That is, association with one's family, a personal
affiliation, differs from association with a political or religious group
in that a court is less willing to step inside the family unit and super
vise the intra-family activities and relationships. On the other hand,
courts have not hesitated to regulate other groups in society, such as
religious or political organizations. 67 The foregoing distinction was
diminished, however, by the Tyson court:
[P]laintiffs' allegation that their right of association has been in
fringed does state a good cause of action. The nub of this claim is
that by declaring these tenants ineligible for continued occupancy
on the basis of their children's acts, the defendants have acted
'solely from the fact of association' by the plaintiffs with their chil
dren. . . . Such a claim, if proven, would run afoul of the First
Amendment which guarantees . . . the right to freely associate
with others, including members of his family, without interference
from the state. 68
64. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
65. It is important to note that interference with the substantive due process right
of individual guilt is repulsive to our judicial system, whether or not the interference
stems from a civil or criminal matter.
66. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396, 398 (D. Neb. 1972). ("It makes no differ
ence 'whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, eco
nomic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.' ").
67. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
68. Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority, 369 F. Supp. 5\3, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
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In Fisher v. Snyder, 69 the court recognized that most of the cases
dealing with the constitutional right to freedom of association for
teachers involved membership in organizations. 70 Yet, it found no
relevant distinction between that type of associational interest and
that asserted by Mrs. Fisher: the right to associate with unrelated
individuals. 71
Similarly, Robinson v. Californian differs from Gormley in that
it involved criminal activity.73 Another distinction is that Robinson
involved a status crime and warned against finding guilty those who
carried a certain status, such as being a drug addict, without evi
dence as to criminal activity.74
Again, while the motivation behind the Supreme Court disal
lowing status crimes may be due to a dislike for punishment without
personal guilt, status crimes have not yet included the of status of
motherhood. Rather, all the disallowed status crimes involve a sta
tus that is tainted with illegality, such as being a drug addict or
felon. 75 The spirit of the law, however, is that there shall be no pun
ishment without personal liability and certainly not for one's status
in society.
Although not entirely analogous, the case most similar to Gor
mley in its facts and issues is Tyson,76 which involved a group of
tenants who brought constitutional claims against the New York
City Housing Authority.77 The plaintiffs' constitutional claim was
whether the Housing Authority "may constitutionally eviCt an entire
1974). This court cited Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), in which a
teacher was dismissed from her position on grounds of immorality, i.e. on the basis of the
guests she entertained at her home. fd. at 397. The court held that a teacher's right to
freely associate was closely aligned to freedom of speech and that neither could be cur
tailed without the strictest of scrutiny. fd. at 398-99.
69. 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972).
70. fd. at 399.
71. fd.
72. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
73. fd. at 660.
74. fd. at 666-67.
75. fd. See also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), which involved a chal
lenge to a Los Angeles ordinance making punishable the failure of a felon to register
with the police within five days after entering the city. fd. at 226. The defendant chal
lenged that statute on the ground that she was not aware that she had a duty to register.
fd. at 227. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute stating that it put an unfair bur
den on defendant to inquire as to a duty to register without notice of such duty. fd. at
229.
76. 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
77. fd. at 516. The tenants' constitutional claims consisted of procedural and sub
stantive due process and equal protection issues under the first, fourth, ninth and four-.
teenth amendments. fd. In addition, the tenants asserted their rights under the United
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family from public housing on the sole ground that an adult child in
that family, who does not reside in the parental home, has commit
ted criminal acts which are deemed nondesirable."78 While Tyson is
factually distinguishable in that all of the children were adults and
did not live at home at the time the criminal acts were committed, it
would be hasty and unwise to dismiss Tyson on this basis alone. The
court in Tyson was entirely justified in focusing upon the lack of a
causal nexus between the parent and the child's act and ignoring the
aspect of whether or not the children lived at home. The Gormley
court should have followed Tyson's example by concentrating on the
relationship of the parent to the child's action. This would have ena
bled the court to use the child's residence as an aspect of the familial
relationship, ie., indicative of whether the parent knew or should
have known of the child's propensity to cause damage and whether
the parents controlled the child's acts.
Lastly, St. Ann v. Polisi,19 like Tyson, is a civil case. The court
in St. Ann refused to suspend the children from school for the violent
act of their mother against a school official, stating that liability
without personal guilt was an encroachment upon a basic substan
tive due process right. 80 The distinguishing feature, of course, is that
in Gormley the relationships are reversed.
V.

THE ApPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHT OF PERSONAL BLAMEWORTHINESS TO
PARENTAL LIABILITY

The doctrine of individual "guilt" has been applied with vary
ing results in cases where the issue is whether parents can be legally
burdened for the tortious acts of their children. Examination of the
common law of tort liability shows that the general rule is that the
relationship of parent and child alone will not impose liability on the
parent for the tort of the child. 81 Specifically, "[t]he parent is not
States Housing Act of 1937. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1401-1430 (1976). 369 F. Supp. at 521. The
court dismissed plaintiffs' claim to a privacy interest. Id at 520.
78. 369 F. Supp. at 518.
79. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id at 425.
81. See, e.g., Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 703 (E.D.N.C. 1954)
(under North Carolina law a parent is not liable for the tort of a minor child by reason of
the parent-child relationship even where a minor child, who could not be sued, negli
gently operates the family car and strikes another driver); Anderson v. Butler, 284 N.C.
723, 730, 202 S.E.2d 585, 589 (1974) (a parent may incur liability for injuries or damage
when the parent entrusts to a minor child an instrumentality that becomes dangerous due
to the youth's immaturity or lack of judgment); Shaw v. Roth, 54 Misc. 2d 418, 282
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liable merely because the child lives at home with him, works for
him, and is under his care, management and control."82 The reason
ing behind the common-law principle of not holding the parent au
tomatically liable was that there was no fusion of identity between
parent and child as there was between husband and wife. 83
One exception to the general common law rule occurs when
parents consent to the child's act or ratify it in some way.84 This
liability is founded on standard negligence principles and is not con
sidered to be an intrusion on substantive due process rights. 85 Such
liability typically arises in situations in which the parent entrusts a
child with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a car, or entrusts the
child with a weapon knowing the child to have dangerous tendencies
under such circumstances. The parent is then liable under both the
ordinary rules of negligence for the dangerous instrumentality, and
under the family purpose doctrine for the car.86
The general common law rule that parents are not liable left
many plaintiffs uncompensated, since minors usually have no con
trol over their finances or have no monetary resources at all. Thus,
many states enacted legislation making parents statutorily liable for
juvenile destruction. 87
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1967) (complaint against parents for an assault committed by their minor
son failed to state a cause of action against parents, where parents had no knowledge of
the child's vicious tendencies); see also 67A C.l.S. Parent and Child § 123, at 493 (1978).
82. Annot., 155 A.L.R. 85, 86 (1945).
83. See, e.g., Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374 (1927); PROSSER,
supra note 46, at 871. See also Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modem and
Common Law, ILL. L. REV. 163 (1921).
84. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 871-72.
85. Id.
86. See Annot. 54 A.L.R.3d 974 (1973); PROSSER, supra note 10, at 871-72. The
family purpose doctrine maintains that the owner of a car is liable for injuries brought on
by the negligent operation of the car by a family member when the car is bought or kept
for the pleasure of the family. Id. at 872.
87. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Vernon
1962); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84). The latter
statute provides:
Parents of an unemancipated child under the age of eighteen and over the
age of seven shall be liable in a civil action for any willful act committed by
said child which results in injury or death to another person or damage to the
property of another, damage to cemetery property, or damage to any state,
county or municipal property. This section shall not apply to a parent who, as a
result of a decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, does not have custody
of such a child at the time of the commission of the tort. Recovery under this
section shall not exceed one thousand dollars for any such cause of action.
Id.
The Gormley court did not use this statute in its analysis because it deals squarely

1983)

PARENT-CHILD LIABILITY

523

The Restatement Second of Torts advocates a standard which
requires parents to exercise reasonable care in controlling the child
so that others including the child are not harmed or injured, if the
parent: "(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control [the] child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity
and opportunity for exercising such control."88
This test was used by the Gormley court when it analyzed the
applicability of the Massachusetts statute. 89 Section 32 allows for
evictions of tenants when there is just cause due to a serious threat to
the health or safety of a tenant or employee of the housing author
ity.90 The statute does not state that it applies to household members
of the tenant. 91 The supreme judicial court found that because the
statute should be interpreted to include family members living at
home, a burden is imposed upon the tenant to show that she could
neither foresee nor prevent the violence of her son. If this was
proven, then there [was] no 'cause' to evict" under the statute. 92 The
court further stated that the evidence in the case before it did "not
negate the awareness of and ability to prevent violence."93 It is im
portant to note, however, that the trial ''judge made no findings as to
whether Mrs. Gormley knew or should have known of her son's pro
pensity for violence, or whether she was able to control or prevent
his actions."94 Since the supreme judicial court heard Gormley on.
appellate review and not on a de novo basis, the court was not at
liberty to make findings not made by the trial court.9S The court
with compensation, not health and safety. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 439
N.E.2d 741 (1982).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 at 123-24 (1965).
89. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 265, 439 N.E.2d 741, 746 (1982).
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121B, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84).
91. The supreme judicial court noted that the amendment to section 32, enacted
after the Gormley case arose, and which added the words "or a member of the tenant's
household" should be read as an indication that the legislature meant for the unamended
statute to also apply to household members. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 264 n.6, 439 N.E.2d
at 745 n.6. Of course, the express addition of "household members" to the statute could
as easily mean that the legislature did not intend for a person other than a tenant to be
included until and unless the legislature decisively said so.
92. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 265,439 N.E.2d 741, 746 (1982).
93. Id
94. Id at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743. As for Mrs. Bunting, the trial judge found that
while she knew or should have known of her son's violent tendencies, she had no ability
to control his actions. Id at 266, 439 N.E.2d at 746.
95. Id at 258, 439 N.E.2d at 741. (court granted a request for direct appellate
review.) A denovo hearing would be one which tries the matter again as if no previous
decision had been rendered and as if the case had not been heard before. Farmingdale
Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 534,536 (D.N.I. 1971). See also 2 Am.
Jur. 2d Admin. Law § 698 (1962).
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erred in not remanding the case back to trial court for determination
of whether Mrs. Gormley had such knowledge or control of her son's
violence that would hold her liable. Furthermore, due to the possi
bility that a trial court's findings as to Mrs. Gormley could differ
from those as to Mrs. Bunting, the supreme judicial court should not
have consolidated these two cases and should be wary of consolidat
ing such cases in the future.
The standard of "knowledge and control" was also used in
DePasquale v. Delio Russo ,96 which came to a conclusion contrary to
Gormley. The parents in DePasquale were not held liable despite
the frequent use of fireworks by the child since there were only two
incidents of misuse of fireworks, an amount insufficient to show a
dangerous propensity on the part of the child. 97 To adopt any other
holding, the court summarized, "would go far toward exposing par
ents to liability for the torts of their children solely because of their
parenthood."98 The record in Gormley indicates that the mothers
had some information of their sons' involvement in delinquent activ
ities,99 yet DePasquale set the standard that, standing alone, "some"
information of the child's tendencies was not enough to impose lia
bility on the parents. lOO It is important that the court determine pre
cisely the amount of information that parents have regarding the
child's involvement in delinquent acts, because the legal question of
parental liability through knowledge and control turns solely upon
this factual determination. 101
In Smith v. Jordan 102 the court chose not to rely upon the par
ents' knowledge, but rather followed the more concrete path of the
common law, that "[t]here must exist an authority from the father to
the son to do the tortious act or a subsequent ratification and adop
tion of it, before responsibility attaches to the parent."103
In applying the Restatement Second test,I04 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Rautbord v. Ehmann, 105
96. 349 Mass. 655, 212 N.E.2d 237 (1965).
97. Id at 659, 212 N.E.2d at 239.
98. Id at 659,212 N.E.2d at 240.
99. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258, 260, 439 N.E.2d 741, 743 (1982).
100. In Gormley, this factual determination should have been made at the trial
level. See supra text accompanying notes 94 and 95.
101. 211 Mass. 269, 97 N.E. 761 (1912).
102. Id at 270-71, 97 N.E. at 761.
103. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104. 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951).
105. Id at 537. (quoting The 84-H, 296 F. 427 (2d Cir. 1923), cerl. denied, 264 U.S.
596 (1924).
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further defined and narrowed the type of knowledge necessary for a
parent to have in order to be liable for the child's tort. "'The privity
or knowledge must be actual and not merely constructive. It in
volves a personal participation of the owner in some fault or act of
negligence. . . . There must be some fault or negligence on his part
or in which he in some way participates.' "106 The mothers in Gor
mley did not have such active knowledge.
In Caldwell v. Zaher, 107 the court found that there was a duty to
control a minor child if they knew of the child's propensity to assault
and molest other children and yet did nothing to stop it. 108 But the
court did allow for a trial regarding the parents' ability to control
their son, or more precisely, "whether the defendants could halt
[their son's] alleged propensity to assault other children and what
steps to this end would be reasonable in the circumstances."I09 Simi
larly, in Gormley it would have been wise if a trial had been held on
whether Mrs. Gormley and Mrs. Bunting had control of their sons.
While this is not an exhaustive study of the parent-child liability
issue, it is adequate to show that the common law does not impose
liability upon the parent for the acts of the child unless permitted by
general rules of negligence, or other tort law. Many states, on the
other hand, have enacted statutes for pecuniary reasons. I10 Case law
is divided between these two camps in finding liability for parents.
Some courts refuse to hold a parent liable for their delinquent chil
dren, III finding it too close to being burdened for doing no wrong;
other courts are more likely to find liability so that injured parties
may receive compensation. 112
We have then an acknowledged important substantive due pro
106. 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962).
107. Id at 592, 183 N.E.2d at 707.
108. Id
109. Id at 593, 183 N.E.2d at 707.
110. See supra note 87.
III. See e.g., Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971), where the
court held that recovery can only be had from a parent if the parent, under the terms of
the state statute, negligently contributes to the tort. Id at 748, 182 S.E.2d at 769. See
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-113 (1966). The issue in Gormley was not that the mothers were
forced to compensate the victims for their property damage, but rather that the mothers
were being forced to leave their homes which compensated no one.
112. See supra note 87. The court in Watson v. Gradzik, 34 Conn. Supp. 7, 373
A.2d 191 (1977) cited Section 52-572 of the General Statutes of Connecticut and stated
that the policy reasons behind the statute were two-fold: first, to deter juvenile delin
quency, and second, to compensate innocent victims. Id at 10, 373 A.2d at 193. The
court in Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) stated that it was better
to let parents pay than to let innocent victims bear a loss. Id at 438.
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cess right not to be impinged upon for another's act. This right is
subject to intrusion when the necessity is great. Acknowledging that
the BHA's goal for safety and security is important, there is a way to
pay credence to their goal and yet not infringe upon the fundamental
right: by increasing the standard of proof.
VI.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The customary manner of protecting an important right is to
increase the standard of proof.ll3 This is exemplified in St. Ann v.
Palisi,1l4 where the court insisted that "[h]aving established a signifi
cant encroachment upon a basic element of due process, the state, in
order to justify this encroachment, must satisfy a substantial bur
den."lls The above standard should apply where, as here, there is a
weighty due process right which is substantial enough to raise the
burden of proof from beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence
to a standard of clear and convincing. This higher standard of proof
is necessary to ascertain, first, if the sons were involved in the
firebombings; second, if the mothers knew or should have known of
the sons' tendencies to commit such acts; and third, whether the
mothers were in a position to exert control over their sons.
This increase in proof would not hinder the BHA's desire for
safe housing because the higher standard of proof would more accu
rately determined if the family members were actually involved in
the illegal activity complained of and whether they would have a
tendency to engage in such acts in the future. A lower standard of
proof is overly inclusive in that it allows the BHA to evict families
without ensuring that the families are the source of the threat to the
safety and security of BHA housing.
The supreme judicial court refused to raise the burden of proof
in Gormley.116 The judicial reasoning to reach that conclusion was
both "roundabout" and erroneous. First, the court acknowledged
the defendants' argument that they had a constitutional right to be
free from liability without fault. I 17 The court then stated this consti
tutional right need be overcome only by the BHA's meeting a ra
tional basis test. 118 The proper standard of proof was then
1l3.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 615 (5th Cir. 1972).
458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
Id. at 582.
387 Mass. at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 267, 439 N.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 270, 439 N.E.2d at 749.
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analyzed l19 wherein the court acknowledged that a higher interest
was more worthy of a higher standard of proof. 120 To begin its anal
ysis, the court examined the interest affected,121 then switched gears
by declaring that the affected interest of the tenants was their right to
housing,122 and not their right to be free from liability without
fault. 123 Had the court focused on the right to individual liability, an
increase in the burden of proof would have been necessary. Addi
tionally, a higher standard of proof does not depend on the civil or
criminal nature of a case,124 "but rather on the basis of the compet
ing interests at stake and the risk which society is willing to assume
for an erroneous decision . . . ."125 Society is not willing to assume
the price of an erroneous decision when a fundamental right is in
volved. As expressed in Karr v. Schmidt, 126 "[t]he due process clause
does, of course, protect freedoms 'great and small' from wholly arbi
trary state action. But it is only when 'fundamental' liberties are at
stake that we place upon the state a 'substantial burden of justifica
tion' for the infringement of liberty."127 Similarly, the court in St.
Ann 128 stated that where there was a significant encroachment upon
a basic element of due process, the state must satisfy a substantial
burden in order to justify the encroachment. 129
There have been several cases in Massachusetts in which the
standard of proof was raised beyond a preponderance of the evi
dence for something other than a fundamental right. 130 These cases
119. Id. at 273, 439 N.E.2d at 751.
120. Id. at 274, 439 N.E.2d at 751.
121. Id. The court began this interest analysis by applying the three-prong Mathews test. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 275, 439 N.E.2d at 751.
123. Id. at 275 n.16, 439 N.E.2d at 751 n.16.
124. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text, for an analysis of the right
not to be burdened under the Mathews three-prong test.
125. French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (M.D.N.C. 1977). This case
concerned an attack on North Carolina's involuntary commitment statute, as a violation
of the 5th and 14th amendments' due process clauses.
126. Id.
127. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).
128. Id. at 615 n.12. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text. See also, Sny
der v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). where the Court stated: '1'he Commonwealth
of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own
conception of policy and fairness unless so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Id. at 105. The right not to be burdened is deeply rooted in our judicial system and its
elimination or diminishment would be offensive to our society. See supra notes 1-16 and
accompanying text.
129. St. Ann v. Palisi. 495 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1974).
130. Id. at 427.
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signify that the supreme judicial court has recognized that there are
areas of law that are sufficiently important, though not fundamental,
to warrant an increase in the standard of proof. If the court finds it
necessary to increase the proof required to determine a testator's po
tency, \31 then surely the court should find an increase necessary
when the issue is a cornerstone of our judicial system, ie., that an
individual is not liable for the acts of another. The supreme judicial
court, when faced with imposing the liability upon one person for
the actions of another, in this case a mother for her son's, should
increase the burden of proof from a mere preponderance of the evi
dence to a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Elridge 132 es
tablished a test which would enable a judge to more accurately de
cide when the standard of proof should be raised:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. l33

The Gormley l34 court applied the Mathews test,135 but errone
ously concluded that the right to a tenancy was the underlying inter
est. The court should have found that the fundamental right to
individual liability was the underlying interest. The application of
the Matthews test to Gormley, utilizing as the basic interest the ac
countability of the mothers for their sons' acts, would be as
follows: 136
1) The private interest affected, that one be blame
worthy before being blamed, is a fundamental
131. See Foley v. Coan, 272 Mass. 207, 209-10,172 N.E. 74, 75 (1930) ("The proof
must be convincing though it need not reach the certainty required in criminal proceed
ings."); Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 517, 138 N.E. 6, 7 (1922) (required proof "be
yond all reasonable doubt" to determine testator's impotence; Swartz v. Sher, 344 Mass.
636, 639, 184 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1962) (used "beyond all reasonable doubt" in a contract
action to recover a deposit for sale of land); Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co.,
107 Mass. 290, 317 (1871) (required "full, clear and decisive [evidence] free from doubt
or uncertainty," in reforming an instrument on the grounds of mistake).
132. Taylor v. Whittier, 240 Mass. 514, 517, 138 N.E. 6, 7 (1922).
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
134. Id at 335.
135. Spence v. Gormley, 387 Mass. 258,439 N.E.2d 741 (1982).
136. Id at 274-77, 439 N.E.2d at 751-52.
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right. This cherished right is one of the corner
stones of our judicial system_ 137
2) The risk of an erroneous decision is severe in two
ways:
a) It would lend a crushing blow to this impor
tant right to allow a court to deprive a person
without a sufficiently high standard of proof,
and
b) the practical effect of an erroneous decision in
this area would be to evict a mother and her
family from low-cost public housing with rea
sonable housing substitutes few and far
between. 138
3) The probable value of this substitute standard of
proof is extremely high since increasing the bur
den accomplishes the objective of protecting per
sons from unearned liability and yet does not
completely eliminate the chances of the BHA
achieving their desired end, since a parent with
knowledge of a violent tendency and control over
the child may still be liable and thus evicted. It is
appropriate that a heavy burden of proof be
placed upon the party attempting to narrow the
fundamental right involved.
4) The government's interest should be stronger in
having fundamental rights protected rather than
in having a mother be evicted because her son
mayor may not have damaged BRA property and
mayor may not return to do the same if the
mother remains. Further, the substitute proce
dure of an increase in the standard of proof is not
a burden to the system since it requires that there
be a closer connection between the liability im
posed and the responsibility for the illegal actions.
This is not a substantial burden to a system that is
erected to mete out justice. 139
137. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 260, 439 N.E.2d at 743.
138. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
139. See e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (1970) ("Yet, on the
whole, the disadvantages the government will suffer from being required to allege good
cause for eviction are not to be compared with the disadvantages that a tenant will suffer
if he is evicted capriciously."); Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853,
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LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE

In conjunction with increasing the standard of proof, an effort
must be made to investigate whether the 'punishment' chosen is the
least restrictive alternative. In Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 140 the circuit
court quoted the United States Supreme Court when it stated that
fundamental personal liberties could not be stifled by legitimate gov
ernmental purposes if the result sought can be more narrowly
achieved. 141
One example of a less restrictive alternative would be that the
BHA could have the mother agree to 'evict' the son, and employ the
aid of an outside agency to help in enforcement. After all, the court
indicated that it would have been willing to allow this type of action
when an adult household member was likely to be violent and could
not be controlled by the tenant. 142 The court concluded that having
taken such preventive measures, the tenant had done all that was
possible and thus should not be held responsible for any subsequent
violence by the household member. 143
There is also support for the argument that it is more appropri
ate to evict only the non-desirable household member with the con
sent of the family, or to have the family find a way to remove the
troublemaking member. This approach is especially applicable
when, as in the Bunting case, the targeted member is an adult who is
away from home more often than not and who is uncontrollable or
unwanted. This allows the family the option of either keeping the
family intact and moving out or keeping the apartment. l44 While
this alternative would be sufficient for an adult household member,
the BHA would have a legitimate hesitancy to require the same in
the case of a minor child. This being so, it may not be wise for a
court to continue to consolidate cases where one household member
861 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1971) ("Nor is it conclusive in the consider
ation of appellants' constitutional claims to argue that there is no constitutional right to
continue living in public housing projects.").
140. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) as an exam
ple of a burden to the system wherein beneficiaries of a trust had to be notified before
action could be taken, creating both a time delay and financial expense.
141. 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 317, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), wherein the
Court stated: "The breadth oflegislative abridgement must be viewed in the light ofless
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. II (1966). (statute requiring teachers to take a loyalty oath invalidated; Court stated
that though the ends were legitimate, a fundamental liberty was at stake, i.e. freedom to
associate).
.
143. Gormley, 387 Mass. at 266, 439 N.E.2d at 746.
144. Id.
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is a minor and the other an adult, since such diverse factual situa
tions may result in entirely different decision,s if decided separately.
Other alternatives would be for the BRA to press criminal
charges against the offender, wherein the BRA would be required to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the household member com
mitted the crime as charged. This course of action would be expedi
tious in removing the offender from the premises if a jail sentence
was imposed and yet would not uproot the family. On the other
hand, if compensation is the ultimate aim, the BRA could bring a
tort action against the mother for money damages. 145 This action
would likely be insufficient, however, against a low-income tenant
who might be judgment proof.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is a substantive due process right not to be blamed for the
act of another or for one's association with others who commit illegal
acts. This right is one of the strongholds of our judicial system and
has attained the status of a fundamental right.
This right, as with most rights, fundamental or not, is not com
pletely free from intrusion. When the governmental interest is suffi
ciently high, an inroad is permissible. Parental liability for wrongful
acts committed by their children is an inroad on the requirement
that there be individual blameworthiness before a burden is im
posed. Traditional tort law does not allow such an infringement un
less the parent may be held liable under an existing theory of tort
liability. Certain statutes, however, have allowed for such liability to
effectuate such goals as the compensation of injured plaintiffs,146 the
promotion of health and safety,147 and when the parent is knowl
edgeable of the child's propensity for danger and is able to control
the child.
In the case at hand, the supreme judicial court erred in dis
missing the tenants' constitutional claim to the fundamental right to
be personally blameworthy. The right is not applicable only in crim
inal cases, nor can it be summarily dismissed on the basis that the
145. See Note, Policy Just(jications for Public Housing Evictions,S COLUM. HUM.
L. REv. 215 (Spring 1973). This note analyzes the policy justifications used by New
York City public housing agencies in evicting whole families for the act of one family
member. Additionally, it explores the social ramifications of saving an apartment versus
saving a family.
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84).
147. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85G (West Supp. 1983-84).
RTS.
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government has a strong concern for the health, safety and welfare
of housing authority tenants and employees since evicting the blame
less will not insure safety for the government's tenants and
employees.
The government can protect its goal of safe housing and yet not
interfere with the fundamental right by merely increasing the gov
ernment's burden of proof from 'preponderance of the evidence' to a
standard of 'clear and convincing evidence'. This would allow the
courts more accuracy in finding the culprit liable and deciding
whether the mothers were aware of the sons' tendencies, and
whether they could control their sons. In addition, the state should
be made to offer less restrictive alternatives, so that, as here, an entire
family would not be uprooted were a more reasonable and temper
ate solution available.
While the state certainly has a legitimate interest in safe, public
housing, this goal was not furthered by the Gormley decision in a
constitutionally sound manner. The court dismissed the due process
right to not be burdened by another's wrong in an attempt to accom
modate the goal of the BHA. The goal of the supreme judicial court
should be to protect this substantive due process right by raising the
burden of proof from a mere preponderance of the evidence stan
dard to a standard of clear and convincing evidence and addition
ally, the court should search for less restrictive alternatives. These
protections of the due process right would not interfere with the
BHA's goal of safe housing since the BHA will be sure that the evic
tion is clearly and convincingly the result of the household members'
action, rather than a fifty-one percent belief. Evicting innocent ten
ants will not bring about more safe housing, only more homeless
people.
Due to the dissimilarity in findings of knowledge and control of
the mothers for their sons, and because of the difference of ages of
the sons, one a minor, the other an adult, the court should not have
combined the Gormley and Bunting cases. The results can differ
markedly in terms of responsibility and choice of less restrictive al
ternatives. The Gormley decision leaves practitioners and lower
courts at a loss when handling cases of this type since the court set no
clear standard as to how to treat the differences between 1) a minor
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child and an adult child, 2) an emancipated child versus unemanci
pated, 3) a child who is frequently at home as opposed to one who is
habitually away.148
Ina A. Forman

148. See

MASS.

GEN.

LAWS

ANN. ch. 121B, § 32 (West Supp. 1983-84).

